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1954] RECENT DECISIONS 447 
CIVIL PRoCEDURE-PoWER OF STATE TO ENJOIN !Ts CITIZENS FROM SUING 
IN ANoTHER STATE UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY Am-Peti-
tioner was injured in the course of employment with respondent, an interstate 
railroad, in Ben Hill County, Georgia, the residence of petitioner. Invoking 
the Federal Employers' Llability Act,1 petitioner filed suit in Jefferson County, 
Alabama, where respondent was doing business. Respondent, relying on section 
14O4(a) of the Judicial Code,2 initiated an equity action in Ben Hill County, 
Georgia, to restrain petitioner from continuing his action in Alabama. The 
trial court sustained a demurrer to respondent's petition. The Georgia Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that Georgia law gave its courts power to prevent its 
citizens from bringing vexatious suits.3 On certiorari from the Supreme Court 
of the United States, held, reversed. Under the Federal Employers' Llability 
Act the employee had a transitory cause of action, and section 14O4(a), which 
authorizes a federal court to transfer a case on grounds of forum non conveniens, 
does not give the same power to a state court; hence, the Georgia court had no 
power to restrain the employee from bringing the Alabama action. Pope 11. 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 73 S.Ct. 749 (1953). 
135 Stat. L. 66 (1909), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §56. 
2 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l404(a) provides: "For the convenience of the parties 
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to 
any other district or division where it might have been brought." 
s Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, 71 S.E. (2d) 243 (1952). 
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Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act provides that an employee 
may bring his action wherever the employer is doing business. In Miles -v. 
Illinois Central R. Co.4 the Supreme Court decided on facts very similar to those 
in the principal case that section 6 prevents state courts from enjoining oppressive 
suits brought by its citizens in courts of other states. The respondent in the 
principal case conceded this point but contended that Congress overruled the 
Miles case by adopting section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code. After the enact-
ment of section 1404(a) the Supreme Court held that cases brought in federal 
courts under the FELA are subject to transfer on grounds of forum non 
conveniens as provided by that section.5 According to the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens a court which has jurisdiction of the parties may dismiss the 
action where the forum is not the most appropriate one for the convenience of 
the parties and witnesses and for the furtherance of justice.6 Respondent argued 
further that the decision in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. -v. Kepner,1 which held that 
a state court could not enjoin one of its residents from prosecuting an FELA 
action in a distant federal court, also was overruled by section 1404(a). In 
the reviser's note to section 1404(a)8 it was said that the Kepner case exemplified 
the inequitable situation which could be alleviated by application of section 
1404(a). However, the Court in the instant case interpreted this note as 
meaning only that "it was the power of the federal court to transfer, and not 
the power of the state court to enjoin, which was the remedy envisioned for 
any injustice wrought by §6 in the Kepner case."9 In a vigorous dissent, 
Justice Frankfurter argued that the legislative history indicated that the Kepner 
case was explicitly mentioned as an example of the type of case section 1404(a) 
would affect. The position taken by Justice Frankfurter reached the more 
desirable conclusion; however, the language of section 1404( a) seems to preclude 
such an interpretation since it pertains only to federal courts. The decision in 
the principal case shows the need for an amendment to section 6 of the FELA 
to give the defendant some measure of protection from oppressive suits, on 
grounds of forum non conveniens. 
John S. Slavens, S.Ed. 
4 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827 (1942). 
5 Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944 (1949). 
6 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947). 
7 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6 (1941). 
s H. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. Al32 (1947); 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 
1952) §l404(a). 
9 Principal case at 385. 
